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Hooked on a feeling: affective
anti-smoking messages are more
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changing implicit evaluations of
smoking
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1 Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA, 2 Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Because implicit evaluations are thought to underlie many aspects of behavior,
researchers have started looking for ways to change them. We examine whether
and when persuasive messages alter strongly held implicit evaluations of smoking. In
smokers, an affective anti-smoking message led to more negative implicit evaluations
on four different implicit measures as compared to a cognitive anti-smoking message
which seemed to backfire. Additional analyses suggested that the observed effects
were mediated by the feelings and emotions raised by the messages. In non-smokers,
both the affective and cognitive message engendered slightly more negative implicit
evaluations. We conclude that persuasive messages change implicit evaluations in a
way that depends on properties of the message and of the participant. Thus, our data
open new avenues for research directed at tailoring persuasive messages to change
implicit evaluations.
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Introduction
As Zajonc (1980) pointed out in his classic paper, people often respond to stimuli in an evaluative
manner even when they do not have the intention to do so, when they have the intention not to do
so, or when they are unaware of the stimuli, the reaction, or the link between both. Such automatic
evaluative responses – or “implicit evaluations” as we will call them (De Houwer, 2009; De Houwer
et al., 2013) – have proved to be a fecund research topic. Over the past two decades, researchers
have explored their properties, developed ways to measure them, and examined their impact on
behavior (see Ferguson and Zayas, 2009; DeHouwer andHermans, 2010, for reviews). Importantly,
numerous studies indicate that the use of implicit measures contributes in a signiﬁcant manner
to our understanding of psychological phenomena in such varied domains as addiction and
substance use (Wiers and Stacy, 2006; Rooke et al., 2008), consumer behavior (Friese et al., 2006),
psychopathology (see Roefs et al., 2011), and social interactions (Fazio and Olson, 2003). Indeed,
implicit measures indicate unique predictive validity even when one takes into account direct
self-report (Greenwald et al., 2009).
Given the importance of implicit measures in predicting behavior, researchers have been
consistently interested in how to inﬂuence them. Theoretical views on the potential to change
implicit evaluations quickly evolved from what could be characterized as a “slow to build and slow
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to change” position (e.g., Smith and DeCoster, 1999; Wilson
et al., 2000; Rydell and McConnell, 2006) to a stance that implicit
evaluations are “fast to build, but slow to change” (Gregg et al.,
2006). Now, as evidence continues to accumulate regarding
ways in which implicit measures are amenable to experimental
manipulations (for reviews see Blair, 2002; Gawronski and
Sritharan, 2010), we seem to be nearing the “fast to build and
fast to change” stage. Although there is increasing acceptance of
the idea that implicit measures are quite malleable, this is not a
“yes or no” question. Instead, it is important to know when and
how this malleability occurs. Learning more about the conditions
under which implicit measures can be inﬂuenced arguably adds
to our understanding of implicit evaluations and helps us to build
more eﬃcient and eﬀective interventions for changing behavior
by changing implicit evaluations.
Before discussing our research, we present a brief overview
of prior research and theorizing about changes in implicit
evaluations. Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011) argued that
there are two primary processes by which implicit evaluations
can change – altering the structure of associations in memory
that give rise to those evaluations or inﬂuencing the activation
level of existing associations. It is typically assumed that
the structure of associations can be changed only gradually
through repeated experiences. For example, implicit evaluations
of stimuli might be changed by repeatedly pairing them with
other positive/negative stimuli (e.g., De Houwer et al., 1998;
Baccus et al., 2004; Dijksterhuis, 2004) or positive/negative
actions such as repeatedly pulling a joystick toward oneself
in response to images of Black people (e.g., Kawakami et al.,
2007). The second route to shifting implicit evaluations (i.e.,
inﬂuencing the activation of associations) is most often studied
by changing the context of evaluation. For example, implicit
race bias is reduced after Black and White faces are viewed
in the context of a church as compared to a graﬃti-covered
street corner (Wittenbrink et al., 2001). Context changes are
also achieved by presenting pictures of counter-stereotypical
exemplars (e.g., Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001) or by having
participants imagine such exemplars (Blair et al., 2001).
Implicit bias has also been reduced by changing the evaluative
context through stimulus recategorization. For instance, implicit
race bias decreases when participants categorize liked Black
athletes and disliked White politicians on the basis of their
profession rather than their race (Mitchell et al., 2003).
Each of these context variables is thought to aﬀect implicit
evaluations by inﬂuencing what knowledge content is activated
in memory (e.g., existing associations between Black people and
positive).
Most studies on changes in implicit evaluations have used
either extensive training (which is assumed to capitalize on
the ﬁrst route) or context manipulations (which is assumed
to capitalize on the second route) as instruments for change.
Recently, however, it has been demonstrated that persuasive
verbal messages can also lead to changes in implicit evaluations.
For instance, Horcajo et al. (2010) found that implicit preferences
for vegetables relative to animals could be increased by providing
participants with a persuasive argument about positive aspects
of eating vegetables. Like other changes in implicit evaluations,
these eﬀects might be produced either by activating existing
knowledge structures or by adding new knowledge to memory.
The latter idea is rarely considered because many theories
postulate that implicit evaluations are the product of associations
that develop gradually as the result of many experiences (e.g.,
Rydell and McConnell, 2006). Based on this assumption, one
would expect that extensive retraining is necessary to change
associations – and thus implicit evaluations – in a lasting manner.
Single events such as the presentation of a persuasive message
should not have this eﬀect. However, recent evidence suggests
that verbal messages can change implicit evaluations by adding
information to memory. For instance, simply telling participants
that one (ﬁctitious) social group has more positive traits than
another (ﬁctitious) social group is suﬃcient to see more positive
implicit evaluations of the former group (De Houwer, 2006;
Gregg et al., 2006; Ranganath and Nosek, 2008). Such eﬀects
cannot be due to the impact of the verbal message on the
activation of existing knowledge structures because the social
groups were new to the participants. On the one hand, this
insight blurs the seemingly neat divide between implicit and
explicit cognition. It seems likely that the complexity of this
distinction has been greatly underestimated in the past (see
De Houwer et al., 2009; De Houwer, 2014). On the other
hand, it points at interesting novel routes for changing implicit
evaluations. More speciﬁcally, if verbal messages can have eﬀects
on novel implicit evaluations, perhaps persuasive messages can
result in changes in the content of knowledge that produces
implicit evaluations toward well-established attitude objects (see
Hughes et al., 2011, for a theoretical account). Because it is
often easier to expose people to persuasive messages than to
extensive training programs, persuasion of implicit evaluations
might turn out to be both an eﬀective and eﬃcient way of
inducing relatively stable changes in implicit evaluations. Future
research on the persuasion of implicit evaluations might not
only have applied value, but could also lead to a more realistic
appreciation of the complex relation between implicit and explicit
cognition.
In order to evaluate the potential of persuasion of implicit
evaluations, however, it does not suﬃce to examine whether
it can take place. We also need to learn more about when
it occurs and how its eﬀects can be maximized. Although it
is now clear that persuasive messages can lead to changes in
implicit evaluations, little is yet known about the moderators of
these changes. We recently showed that a persuasive message
about a consumer item is more impactful on implicit evaluations
when attributed to a source high in credibility (i.e., expertise
and trustworthiness) as compared to low in credibility (Smith
et al., 2013). Similar eﬀects based on a source’s likeability
and attractiveness were observed using the Implicit Association
Test (IAT; Smith and De Houwer, 2014). Relatedly, people
show an increased preference for a political proposal when
presented by a member of their political ingroup (Smith
et al., 2012). In each of those investigations, all participants
read an identical message and the source of the message
was manipulated; in the present work, we focus on another
crucial aspect of persuasive messages, namely the content of the
messages.
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From the range of content-related dimensions that might
moderate the impact of persuasive messages on implicit
evaluations, we decided to begin with the aﬀective or cognitive
nature of the message for two reasons. First, prior research
has shown that the aﬀective or cognitive nature of persuasive
messages is an important moderator in the persuasion of explicit
evaluations. More speciﬁcally, aﬀective arguments are more
eﬀective at changing evaluations that are aﬀective in nature
whereas cognitive arguments are more eﬀective at changing
evaluations that are cognitive in nature (e.g., Fabrigar and Petty,
1999). Given that research has revealed important parallels
between the variables that moderate persuasion of explicit
evaluations and those that moderate persuasion of implicit
evaluations (e.g., Marini et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2013), one can
predict that the aﬀective or cognitive nature of the persuasive
message could have a similar impact in the persuasion of implicit
evaluations. That is, those implicit evaluations that are primarily
aﬀective in nature might be more susceptible to the impact of
aﬀective than cognitive persuasive messages whereas the reverse
might be true for those implicit evaluations that are primarily
cognitive in nature.
In our studies, we focused on implicit evaluations of smoking
in smokers in part because there are good reasons to assume that
these evaluations are mostly aﬀective in nature. Hence, based
on the general principle that persuasive messages have more
impact when they match the targeted evaluations in terms of
the aﬀective or cognitive nature, we can be fairly conﬁdent in
our prediction that implicit evaluations of smoking in smokers
should change more eﬀectively in line with aﬀective persuasive
messages than cognitive persuasive messages. The reasons we
believe that implicit evaluations of smokers are aﬀective in
nature are twofold. First, a number of ﬁndings suggest that
implicit evaluations are generally more aﬀect-based than explicit
evaluations. For instance, a meta-analysis found the relationship
between implicit and explicit evaluations is strengthened when
explicit evaluations are more aﬀective as opposed to cognitive
(Hofmann et al., 2005; see Gawronski and LeBel, 2008; Smith and
Nosek, 2011 for additional evidence for the relatively aﬀective
nature of implicit evaluations). Second, there is evidence that
explicit evaluations of smoking in smokers are more related
to aﬀect than to cognition (Traﬁmow and Sheeran, 1998). If
smokers’ explicit evaluations of smoking tend to be aﬀect-
based and implicit evaluations generally tend to be more aﬀect-
based than the explicit evaluations, it is very likely that implicit
evaluations of smoking are aﬀect-based.
In the current work, we operationalized aﬀect and cognition
through the use of anti-smoking persuasive messages that have
been shown to eﬀectively appeal to either feelings or reasoning
(See et al., 2008). In four studies, we presented participants
with persuasive anti-smoking messages focusing on aﬀective or
cognitive arguments. We compared the relative eﬀectiveness of
these two types of verbal persuasive messages at changing implicit
evaluations of smoking among current smokers. The focus on
implicit evaluations of smoking in current smokers has the
additional advantage that it provides a strong test of the power
of persuasive messages because implicit evaluations toward
smoking are likely to be long-standing, important evaluations.
In Studies 1 and 2 we test the prediction that implicit
evaluations of smoking in smokers will be more negative after
reading an aﬀective anti-smoking message as compared to
a cognitive anti-smoking message. In these studies, implicit
evaluations are captured using a personalized version of the IAT
(Olson and Fazio, 2004), an Aﬀect Misattribution Procedure
(AMP; Payne et al., 2005), and an Evaluative Priming task (EP:
Fazio et al., 1986). In Study 3, we include a control condition
and test predictions using the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), in
addition to also testing eﬀects among non-smokers. Finally, in a
fourth study using the AMP, we again include a control condition
and test the mediational process by which the anti-smoking
messages impact implicit evaluations. Although the focus of the
current work is on the moderation and mediation of changes
in implicit evaluations, we also include explicit evaluations in
all four studies in the interest of completeness and comparison.
Participants in all studies read a consent form and were debriefed
about the purpose of the study; deception was not utilized in
any study, and all studies were conducted in line with the ethical
guidelines of Ghent University.
Study 1
Method
Participants
Participants were 2201 visitors to the Project Implicit research site
who self-reported that they currently smoked cigarettes; 66.1%
women (Mage = 30.5; SD= 10.2; range: 18–69). Participants were
citizens of 29 diﬀerent countries (71.8% USA, 6.4% Canada, 5.5%
UK, all others< 1.5%). Themodal response for smoking behavior
was “I smoke between 1 and 5 cigarettes per day.”
Materials
Persuasive messages
Participants read one of two brief anti-smoking messages that
was either aﬀective or cognitive in content. Previous research
by See et al. (2008) showed the aﬀective message is successful at
eliciting relativelymore feelings than thoughts while the cognitive
message elicits relatively more thoughts than feelings. However,
it is important to note that although See et al. (2008) established
that these persuasive messages diﬀer on engendering feelings or
thoughts, they did not test how persuasive the messages were
(neither in terms of their impact on explicit evaluations nor in
terms of perceived persuasiveness). Therefore, we asked 38 self-
reported smokers to evaluate the strength of the anti-smoking
message from “not at all strong” to “extremely strong” with
higher scores indicating greater perceived argument strength.
1We chose our sample sizes a priori, though somewhat arbitrarily, aiming for
roughly 200 smokers per study. When sample sizes were near that number, we
requested that the study be removed from the Project Implicit research pool, which
takes a few days to occur. Variation in the number of participants across studies
is due to lag time in either checking the study n or in the study coming down.
The number of smokers in Study 3 is somewhat lower than hoped for as we had
to estimate the proportion of smokers within the sample based on previous data
collections at Project Implicit. The number of completed sessions for a study can
be checked without downloading raw data and at no point did we look at data until
the study removal request was made and the study was completed.
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Participants did not report a diﬀerence in perceived strength
of the arguments based on whether the argument was aﬀective
(M = 3.00, SD = 1.33) or cognitive (M = 2.95, SD = 0.89),
t(36) = 0.14, p= 0.89, d = 0.04.
Personalized IAT
Participants completed a variant of the IAT designed to measure
the strength of associations between “smoking,” “non-smoking,”
“I like,” and “I dislike” (see Han et al., 2006, Experiment 2, for
a similar approach). Participants sorted stimuli quickly while
making as few errors as possible. Category labels appeared in
the upper-left and upper-right of the screen and participants
used the “E” key and “I” key to sort stimuli to the left
and right, respectively. Stimuli for smoking and non-smoking
categories were six pictures of smoking-related stimuli (e.g.,
cigarette, man smoking) and six images related to “not smoking”
(e.g., man blowing a whistle, pencil being sharpened), while
stimuli for evaluative categories were positive and negative
words. The number and order of trials in the IAT followed
the recommendations of Nosek et al. (2005). IAT scores were
calculated using the D-algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003) with
positive numbers indicating a preference for smoking relative
to not-smoking. Data from 16 participants (7.3%) were deleted
for making too many errors (>40% in any one block or >30%
overall); split-half correlation of the remaining 204 IAT scores
was r = 0.64.
Aﬀect Misattribution Procedure
In each trial of the AMP, participants viewed a prime stimulus
followed by a Chinese pictograph. Participants were instructed to
ignore the initial stimulus and rate whether the pictograph was
more pleasant or less pleasant than average. Previous research
has shown the aﬀective valence of the prime can bleed over
into ratings of the Chinese pictographs. In the current study,
participants viewed three types of primes; the images used in
the IAT were used for “smoking” and “non-smoking” primes
and a gray rectangle served as a neutral prime. Participants saw
24 of each of the three types of primes, for a total of 72 trials.
An individual trial began with the presentation of the prime
(100 ms). This was followed by a blank screen (100 ms) after
which one of the 72 Chinese pictographs was presented (100 ms).
Finally, a black and white mask image was presented until
the participant responded. This procedure produces indicator
of implicit positivity for each of the three types of trials by
calculating the proportion of “pleasant” responses following each
of the categories of primes (i.e., smoking, not-smoking, and
neutral). In addition, individual AMP scores can be calculated by
subtracting the proportion of positive responses following non-
smoking responses from those following smoking responses. In
this way, positive scores indicate a relative implicit preference
for smoking. Data from three participants (1.4%) who responded
either “positive” or “negative” to all 72 trials were deleted; split-
half reliability of the remaining 217 AMP scores was r = 0.59.
Explicit evaluations
Participants reported their evaluations of smoking by responding
to “Which of the following statements best describes you?” using
a seven-point response scale ranging from−3 to+3, anchored by
“I strongly prefer smoking to not smoking” and “I strongly prefer
not smoking to smoking.” Positive scores indicate a preference
for smoking.
Procedure
Visitors to the Project Implicit research site ﬁrst register to
be involved in research studies at which time they complete
demographic information. After completing informed consent
procedures, participants were asked to indicate whether they
smoked cigarettes. Those participants who said “no” were then
reassigned to complete a diﬀerent study within the Project
Implicit research pool. Participants who responded “yes” were
asked to report how much they smoked. They were then told the
study regarded reading and memory, were randomly assigned to
read the aﬀective or cognitive persuasive message, and completed
the personalized IAT, AMP, and explicit preferences in that order.
Results
Overall, participants indicated strong implicit preferences for
non-smoking relative to smoking using the personalized IAT,
M = −0.33, SD = 0.52, t(203) = −8.99, p < 0.0001, Cohen’s
d =−0.63 and the AMP,M =−0.18, SD= 0.32, t(216) =−8.09,
p < 0.0001, d = −0.55. Participants’ self-reported preference for
smoking did not diﬀer from zero (i.e., no preference), M = 0.01,
SD = 1.98, t(217) = 0.10, p = 0.91, d = 0.01. Participants’
self-reported preferences correlated with the personalized IAT at
r = 0.21, p = 0.002 and with the AMP at r = 0.21, p = 0.002;
scores on the personalized IAT correlated with AMP scores at
r = 0.21, p= 0.004.
Explicit Evaluations
Smokers’ self-reported evaluations were unaﬀected by the type of
persuasive message they read; evaluations were not more negative
following the aﬀective message (M = −0.02, SD = 2.01) than
the cognitive message (M = 0.07, SD = 1.94), t(216) = −0.33,
p= 0.74, d = 0.05.
Personalized IAT
When measured using the personalized IAT, smokers’ implicit
evaluations were not more negative following the aﬀective
message (M = −0.34, SD = 0.52) than the cognitive message
(M = −0.30, SD = 0.51), t(202) = 0.52, p = 0.60, d = 0.08, 95%
CIdiﬀ =−0.45, 0.63.
Affect Misattribution Procedure
We tested the eﬀect of the persuasive messages on the AMP by
comparing the diﬀerence scores composed of responses to the
smoking and non-smoking trials of the AMP. AMP scores were
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the type of persuasive message they read;
evaluations were more negative following the aﬀective message
(M =−0.24, SD= 0.37) than the cognitive message (M =−0.10,
SD= 0.23), t(215) = 3.16, p= 0.002, d = 0.45, 95% CIdiﬀ = 0.05,
0.22.
Discussion
In the current study, we observed for the ﬁrst time that implicit
evaluations of smoking in smokers – as measured by the
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AMP – were more anti-smoking following an aﬀective anti-
smoking message than after a cognitive anti-smoking message.
This observation conﬁrms earlier ﬁndings showing that directly
persuasive messages can change implicit evaluations, but also
shows that the eﬀect depends on the content of the persuasive
message. In contrast, the content of the message did not have
an impact on explicit evaluations. Finally, the content of the
message did not have an eﬀect on the second measure of implicit
evaluations, the personalized IAT. Therefore, to test whether the
observed eﬀects are limited to the AMP, we ran a second study
that again used the personalized IAT, but also included another
implicit measure, namely the evaluative priming task.
Study 2
Method
Participants
Participants were 254 visitors to the Project Implicit research site
who self-reported that they currently smoked cigarettes; 68.5%
women (Mage = 33.2; SD= 11.9; range: 18–72). Participants were
citizens of 32 diﬀerent countries (69.2% USA, 7.1% Canada, 5.5%
UK, all others< 2.5%). Themodal response for smoking behavior
was “I smoke between 10 and 20 cigarettes per day.”
Materials
Persuasive messages
Aﬀective and cognitive messages were identical to those
presented in Study 1.
Personalized IAT
The personalized IAT was identical to the one used in Study 1.
Positive scores again indicate a relative preference for smoking.
IAT scores from the 14 participants (7.3%) who committed too
many errors were deleted; for the remaining 240 participants,
split-half correlation of the IAT was r= 0.59.
Evaluative priming
In the EP task, participants were told that words and images
would appear one after the other on the screen. They were
instructed that their task was simply to classify each word they
saw as being good or bad using the ‘E’ and ‘I’ keys of a computer
keyboard. The labels “bad” and “good” appeared in the left and
right upper corners of the screen, respectively. A single trial
consisted of a ﬁxation cross presented in white (500 ms), a blank
screen (500 ms), a prime (200 ms), a post-prime pause (50 ms),
and the presentation of a target word in white font (1500 ms).
The inter-trial interval was set to vary randomly around 1000 ms
with the limits of 500 and 1500 ms. There were four types of
trials – smoking+good, smoking+bad, non-smoking+good, and
non-smoking+bad. Participants ﬁrst completed eight practice
trials (two of each of the four types of trials), then completed
180 trials separated into three blocks of 60; each of the three
blocks of 60 trials contained 15 of the four types of trials (e.g.,
smoking+good). The EP task was scored by dropping trials
with an incorrect response (7.5%) as well any trials on which
reaction times were at least 2.5 standard deviation removed from
an individual’s mean for that type of trial (9.3% of all trials).
Finally, data from participants who made errors at a rate >2.5
standard deviation from the mean was deleted (30 participants;
8% of potential data). A diﬀerence score was created for each
participant by subtracting mean latencies for smoking+bad
trials from mean latencies for smoking+good trials. A second
diﬀerence score was created in the same way for non-smoking
trials so that, in both cases, higher scores indicated positivity.
Following this, a diﬀerence score was constructed by subtracting
positivity toward Non-smoking from positivity toward Smoking.
Thus, positive scores indicate a preference for smoking; split-half
reliability of the EP scores was r = 0.31.
Explicit evaluations
Explicit evaluations were measured as in Study 1; positive scores
again indicated a relative preference for smoking.
Procedure
The procedure followed that of Study 1 exactly, except for the
replacement of the AMP with an EP task. Participants completed
a personalized IAT and the EP task in a counterbalanced order
and always reported explicit evaluations last.
Results
Overall, participants indicated a strong implicit preference for
non-smoking relative to smoking using the personalized IAT,
M = −0.41, SD = 0.51, t(239) = −12.42, p < 0.0001, d = −0.80
and the EP task, M = −24.8, SD = 62.6, t(249) = −6.27,
p < 0.0001, d = −0.40. Participants’ self-reported preference for
smoking did not diﬀer from zero (i.e., no preference), M = 0.21,
SD = 1.97, t(251) = 1.70, p = 0.091, d = 0.11. Participants’
self-reported preferences correlated with the personalized IAT
at r = 0.28, p < 0.0001, but did not correlate with the EP task,
r = 0.003, p= 0.97; scores on the EP task, however, did correlate
with scores on the personalized IAT, r = 0.21, p= 0.001.
Explicit Evaluations
Explicit preferences were unaﬀected by the manipulation of
message type; evaluations were not more negative following the
aﬀective message (M = 0.15, SD = 2.01) than the cognitive
message (M = 0.27, SD = 1.92), t(250) = 0.47, p = 0.64,
d=−0.06, 95% CIdiﬀ =−0.37, 0.61.
Personalized IAT
Conﬁrming the hypothesis of this study, smokers’ implicit
evaluations of smoking weremore negative whenmeasured using
the personalized IAT following the aﬀective message (M=−0.49,
SD = 0.48) than the cognitive message (M = −0.32, SD = 0.53),
t(238) =−2.60, p= 0.01, d= 0.33, 95% CIdiﬀ = 0.04, 0.30.
Evaluative Priming
Smokers’ implicit evaluations of smoking were alsomore negative
on the EP task following the aﬀective message (M = −33.06,
SD = 64.03) than the cognitive message (M = −16.32,
SD= 60.12), t(248)= 2.13, p= 0.034, d= 0.27, 95% CIdiﬀ= 1.26,
32.22.
Discussion
In Study 2, using two very diﬀerent implicit measures, we
observed that implicit evaluations of smoking in smokers were
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more negative after reading an aﬀective anti-smoking message
than after reading a cognitive anti-smoking message. Explicit
evaluations, again, were not diﬀerentially aﬀected by the type of
message. It should be noted that, whereas in Study 1 implicit
evaluations captured by the personalized IAT were not more
negative following the aﬀective than cognitive message, in the
current study they were (see LeBel and Paunonen, 2011, for a
discussion of replication with implicit measures). As such, we
conducted a combined analysis across the two studies; this test
revealed a main eﬀect of message type on the personalized IAT,
t(442) = 2.09, p = 0.037, d = 0.20 which suggests that we can
take seriously the diﬀerential impact of aﬀective and cognitive
messages on the personalized IAT.
Importantly, because both Studies 1 and 2 involved only
a comparison of the eﬀect of an aﬀective vs. a cognitive
negative message, we cannot yet make conclusions regarding the
eﬀectiveness of each type of message. In principle, both could
have resulted in a more negative implicit evaluation, but the
aﬀective message more so than the cognitive message. However,
it is also possible that the cognitive message resulted in less
negative implicit evaluations of smoking (i.e., reactance) whereas
the aﬀective message might have had no eﬀect. To examine
this further, we next included a control condition to allow us
to separately examine the eﬀect of the aﬀective and cognitive
messages. In addition, we included non-smoking participants to
examine whether the persuasive messages have a similar impact
on smokers and non-smokers. Finally, we used a fourth implicit
measure, the standard IAT.
Study 3
Method
Participants
Participants were 1055 visitors to the Project Implicit research
website; 68.3% women (Mage = 29.2; SD = 11.4; range: 18–
74). Participants were citizens of 69 diﬀerent countries (79.3%
USA, 3.6% UK, 3.2% Canada, all others < 1%). Of the 1039
who reported their smoking behavior, 17.8% were smokers,
18.6% former smokers, and 63.6% non-smokers. Only those
participants reporting being current smokers (n = 185) or non-
smokers (n = 723) were retained for analyses, leaving a usable
sample of 908. For participants who reported being current
smokers, the modal response for smoking behavior was “I smoke
between 1 and 5 cigarettes per day.”
Materials
Anti-smoking messages
The aﬀective and cognitive messages were identical to those used
in Studies 1 and 2. In the control condition, participants read a
negative review of an apartment complex.
Implicit Association Test
The IAT followed the same presentation and scoring procedure
as in Studies 1 and 2 except that the labels “I like” and “I dislike”
were changed to “Positive” and “Negative.” Positive scores again
indicated a preference for smoking relative to not-smoking; split-
half correlation of the IAT was r = 0.62.
Explicit evaluations
Participants reported their preference for smoking relative to
non-smoking as in the two previous studies; positive numbers
again indicate a preference for smoking.
Procedure
Participants randomly assigned to complete the current study
were informed they were going to complete a study about
reading comprehension and memory. Immediately following
these instructions, participants were asked “Which of the
following is most true for you?” with the answer choices of
“I currently smoke cigarettes,” “I used to smoke cigarettes,
but I quit,” and “I have never smoked cigarettes.” If they
reported they currently smoke cigarettes, they were asked how
much they currently smoke. Following this, participants were
randomly assigned to read either the aﬀective anti-smoking,
cognitive anti-smoking, or control message. Immediately after
the manipulation, participants completed the smoking IAT and
explicit self-report in that order.
Results
Implicit Association Test
Hypotheses were tested using a 3(Condition: Aﬀect vs. Cognition
vs. Control) × 2(Smoking Status: Smoker vs. Non-Smoker)
ANOVA with all factors tested between-participants. There was
a main eﬀect of smoking status, F(1,786) = 79.70, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.092, such that smokers had less negative implicit smoking
evaluations (M = −0.33, SD = 0.50) than did non-smokers
(M = −0.67, SD = 0.44). There was also a main eﬀect of
condition, F(2,786) = 6.20, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.02 which was
qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction, F(2,786)= 10.82, p< 0.001,
η2 = 0.03 (see Figure 1). In support of the hypothesis, implicit
smoking evaluations of current smokers were more negative
following an aﬀective argument (M = −0.50, SD = 0.52) than
following a cognitive argument (M = −0.11, SD = 0.47),
t(91) = 3.77, p = 0.0003, d = 0.79, 95% CIdiﬀ = 0.19, 0.60.
In addition, implicit evaluations were marginally more negative
following an aﬀective argument than following a control message
(M = −0.33, SD = 0.43), t(111) = 1.98, p = 0.063, d = 0.36,
95% CIdiﬀ = −0.01, 0.35 while implicit evaluations were actually
less anti-smoking following the cognitive message than following
the control message, t(100) = 2.49, p = 0.015, d = 0.51, 95%
CIdiﬀ =−0.41,−0.05.
In contrast, for non-smokers, there was no observed diﬀerence
in implicit evaluations depending on whether they read the
aﬀective persuasive message (M = −0.69, SD = 0.45) or the
cognitive message (M = −0.74, SD = 0.36), t(420) = 1.19,
p = 0.24, d = 0.12, 95% CIdiﬀ = −0.13, 0.03. For non-smokers,
implicit evaluations were more negative than the control message
(M =−0.60, SD= 0.46) both after reading the aﬀective message,
t(433) = 2.18, p = 0.030, d = 0.20, 95% CIdiﬀ = 0.01, 0.18 and
after reading the cognitive message, t(417) = 3.53, p = 0.0005,
d = 0.34, 95% CIdiﬀ = 0.06, 0.22.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1488
Smith and De Houwer Persuasive messages’ impact on implicit evaluations
FIGURE 1 | IAT D-scores (top) and preference ratings (bottom) for
smoking as a function of smoking status and the type of persuasive
message in Study 3. Positive scores indicate a preference for smoking. Error
bars indicate the 95% confidence interval around the mean.
Explicit Evaluations
Explicit evaluations were also tested using a 3(Condition: Aﬀect
vs. Cognition vs. Control) × 2(Smoking Status: Smoker vs. Non-
Smoker) ANOVA with all factors tested between-participants.
There was a main eﬀect of smoking status, F(1,888) = 905.90,
p< 0.001, η2 = 0.51, such that smokers had less negative explicit
smoking evaluations (M = −0.33, SD = 0.50) than did non-
smokers (M = −0.67, SD = 0.44). There was also a main eﬀect
of condition, F(2,888) = 6.20, p = 0.004, η2 = 0.01 which was
qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction, F(2,888) = 5.78, p = 0.003,
η2 = 0.01 (see Figure 1).
Self-reported smoking evaluations of current smokers were
more negative following an aﬀective argument (M = −0.10,
SD = 1.85) than following a cognitive argument (M = 0.60,
SD= 1.54), t(107) = 2.13, p= 0.036, d= 0.41, 95% CIdiﬀ = 0.05,
1.36. Self-reported evaluations were marginally more negative
following an aﬀective argument than following a control message
(M = 0.51, SD = 1.64), t(124) = 1.96, p = 0.052, d = 0.35,
95% CIdiﬀ = −0.01, 1.33 while self-reported evaluations did
not diﬀer following the cognitive message compared to the
control message, t(115) = 0.31, p = 0.76, d = 0.06, 95%
CIdiﬀ =−0.68, 0.50.
In contrast, for non-smokers, self-reported evaluations were
marginally less negative after reading the aﬀective message
(M =−2.65, SD= 0.99) than the cognitive message (M =−2.79,
SD = 0.72), t(467) = 1.81, p = 0.070, d = 0.17, 95%
CIdiﬀ = −0.30, 0.01. For non-smokers, explicit evaluations
were not more negative after reading the aﬀective message as
compared to the control message (M = −2.49, SD = 1.23),
t(485) = 1.55, p= 0.12, d = 0.14, 95% CIdiﬀ = −0.04, 0.36 while
reading the cognitive message did result in more negative explicit
evaluations than reading the control message, t(478) = 3.26,
p= 0.001, d = 0.30, 95% CIdiﬀ = 0.12, 0.48.
Discussion
In this third study, we went beyond the previous studies in
several ways. First, we replicated the eﬀects of verbal persuasive
messages on implicit evaluations of smokers using yet another
implicit measure (i.e., a standard IAT). Second, the inclusion of
a control condition allowed us to conclude that an aﬀective anti-
smoking message increases the negativity of implicit evaluations
of smoking in smokers, albeit only marginally. Interestingly, our
study also shows that a cognitive anti-smoking message renders
implicit evaluations in smokers less negative rather than more
negative, thus showing evidence of reactance to the message.
One possible explanation for this reactance eﬀect is suggested
by inoculation theory (e.g., McGuire, 1961). Speciﬁcally, smokers
may be more commonly exposed to the type of information
included in our cognitive message and are therefore more
practiced at refuting this type of argument. Thus, when they
read this type of messages, they may automatically engage
counterarguments whose existence make implicit evaluations
toward smoking less negative. Regardless of the validity of
this explanation, the intriguing and unexpected reactance eﬀect
merits replication and further investigation.
On the one hand, the ﬁnding that the type of persuasive
message matters for implicit evaluations is good news for
persuasion researchers because it reveals that at least some
(i.e., aﬀective) persuasive messages can have desirable eﬀects
on implicit evaluations of important and well-known attitudes
objects such as smoking. On the other hand, it shows that other
(i.e., cognitive) persuasive messages can have an unexpected
undesirable eﬀect. Hence, persuasion researchers are well-
advised to always check the eﬀect of their messages on implicit
evaluations.
We note that in Study 3, explicit evaluations of smokers
were also more negative following the aﬀective than cognitive
message, while this was not true in any of the other four
studies (including the footnoted study). To shed light on this
ambiguity, we conducted a combined analysis across the ﬁve data
collections detailed herein. This analysis did not reveal a main
eﬀect of message type (including only the aﬀective and cognitive
conditions) on explicit evaluations, t(858) = 3.01, p = 0.083,
d = 0.12, suggesting that the messages had no consistent eﬀect
on explicit evaluations.
The lack of an eﬀect on explicit evaluations in smokers lends
credence to the argument that implicit evaluations of smoking
in smokers are aﬀective in nature and thus more susceptible to
the impact of aﬀective persuasive messages. On the one hand, it is
possible that implicit evaluations of smoking are aﬀective because
they are implicit, that is, because all implicit evaluations may be
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primarily aﬀective in nature. On the other hand, it is possible
that implicit evaluations of smoking are aﬀective because of the
topic of smoking, that is, because all evaluations (i.e., implicit
and explicit) of smoking in smokers are aﬀective. The fact that
only implicit but not explicit evaluations of smoking in smokers
were inﬂuenced by the nature of the message is more in line
with the ﬁrst explanation. It should be noted, however, that the
nature of the message had little impact on implicit evaluations
of smoking in non-smokers. If implicit evaluations are by default
aﬀective in nature, aﬀective messages should have had a bigger
impact on implicit evaluations in non-smokers as well. Although
speculative, the full set of results of Study 3 could be explained
if one both assumes that (1) implicit evaluations are on average
more aﬀective in nature than explicit evaluations and (2) (implicit
and explicit) evaluations of smokers are on averagemore aﬀective
in nature than (implicit and explicit) evaluations of non-smokers.
Given that messages have the biggest eﬀect when they match
the aﬀective or cognitive nature of the evaluations (Fabrigar
and Petty, 1999), aﬀective messages can be expected to have the
biggest impact on implicit evaluations of smoking in smokers
and the smallest impact on explicit evaluations of smoking in
non-smokers whereas cognitive messages would have the biggest
impact on explicit evaluations of smoking in non-smokers and
the smallest eﬀect (or even reversed eﬀect) on implicit evaluations
of smoking in smokers.
Our data are the ﬁrst demonstration that persuasion of
implicit evaluations depends on the aﬀective or cognitive content
of the persuasive message. Moreover, the diﬀerences in results
between smokers and non-smokers show that one should
consider not only the content of the message when attempting
to change implicit evaluations but also the characteristics of the
person whose implicit evaluations you are attempting to change.
As such, our results provide important new information about
persuasion of implicit evaluations.
Study 42
Until now, we have provided consistent evidence that an aﬀective
anti-smoking message is more eﬀective than a cognitive anti-
smoking message at impacting responses on implicit measures.
Of particular note, we have done so using a variety of measures
which diﬀer from each other in a number of ways, thereby
2We also ran a study (n= 122) identical to Study 4 (without the control condition)
using an IAT. We did not observe an eﬀect of condition; IAT scores equally
negative following the aﬀective message (M =−0.47, SD= 0.52) and the cognitive
message (M = −0.54, SD = 0.52), t(108) = 0.71, p = 0.48, d = −0.14, 95%
CIdiﬀ = −0.27, 0.13. We also did not observe a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the messages
on explicit evaluations; evaluations were similarly negative following the aﬀective
message (M=−0.39, SD= 2.02) and the cognitive message (M= 0.01, SD= 1.92),
t(119)=−1.12, p= 0.26, d= 0.20, 95% CIdiﬀ =−0.31, 1.12. When combining the
results of this study and those of Study 3 – which also employed an IAT – the eﬀect
of message type did not reach conventional levels of signiﬁcance, t(201) = 1.62,
p = 0.11, d = 0.23, although the means were in the hypothesized direction. Thus,
one could conclude that IAT eﬀects are not particularly sensitive to the content of
persuasive messages. However, the diﬀerent studies were not run at similar times
of the year (e.g., only the additional study that failed to reveal the expected eﬀect
was run during the summer holidays) and given that in both of the IAT studies,
the eﬀect of message content was in the expected direction, we are hesitant to draw
strong conclusions regarding this issue.
increasing the generalizability of our ﬁndings. A ﬁnal concern
is that the manipulations we used (taken from See et al., 2008)
varied in a number of ways besides their observed ability to
invoke feelings vs. thoughts. Although we can be sure that
the content of the messages was crucial, we cannot be sure
whether it is the aﬀective or cognitive nature of the message
that moderated implicit evaluations. We therefore ran a fourth
study that allowed us to address this question. Following the
manipulation and measurement, we asked participants to rate
several properties of the messages. This allowed us to assess via
mediational analyses which properties of the messages mediated
the eﬀect of the messages on implicit evaluations. Finally,
we used the AMP as an index of implicit evaluations and
included a control condition with the neutral message from
Study 3.
Method
Participants
Participants were 225 visitors to the Project Implicit research site
who self-reported that they currently smoked cigarettes; 59.9%
women (Mage = 29.8; SD= 11.2; range: 18–67). Participants were
citizens of 36 diﬀerent countries (58.4% USA, 7.7% UK, 5.0%
Canada, all others < 3.6%). The average number of cigarettes
smoked per day was 8.20 (SD = 7.60).
Materials
Persuasive messages
Aﬀective, cognitive, and control messages were identical to those
presented in previous studies.
Aﬀect Misattribution Procedure
The AMP was identical to the one used in Study 1. Again,
three separate scores were calculated, each being a proportion of
times that participants responded “pleasant” following each of the
three types of stimuli (i.e., smoking, non-smoking, and neutral).
A diﬀerence score was then calculated by subtracting the scores
for non-smoking from the scores for smoking. Thus, higher
scores indicate more positive evaluations of smoking. Split-half
reliability of the AMP scores was r = 0.60.
Explicit evaluations
Explicit evaluations were measured as in each of the previous
studies with positive scores indicating a relative preference for
smoking.
Questions about manipulation
Participants responded to ﬁve items about the persuasive
argument. Three of the items consisted of a ﬁve-point scale
anchored by 1 = “Not at all [relevant/strong/often]” and
5 = “Very [relevant/strong/often].” Speciﬁcally, we measured
the relevance of the argument (“How relevant do you think the
argument you just read is to your own smoking behavior?”),
the strength of the argument (“How strong of an argument
against smoking do you think it is?”), and how familiar
participants would be with similar arguments (“How often do
you hear arguments like this against smoking?”). In addition,
they responded to the items, “How much would you say the
message you read appeals to feelings and emotions?” and “How
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much would you say the message you read appeals to thoughts
and beliefs?” using a 6-point scale where 1 = “Not at all” and
6= “A lot.”
Procedure
The procedure largely followed that of Study 3. Participants
assigned to this study were asked to self-report whether they
currently smoked cigarettes. Those participants who indicated
that they did not were reassigned to a new study, while those
participants who indicated that they did smoke were asked to
report how many cigarettes they currently smoke. Participants
were then informed that they were completing a study about
reading comprehension and memory before being assigned to
read either the aﬀective or cognitive persuasive anti-smoking
message or a control message. Following the manipulation,
participants completed an AMP and explicit evaluations in
that order. Participants were then exposed to the message a
second time to refamiliarize themselves with it before answering
the three items about the message (relevance, strength, and
familiarity) in that order, presented on a single page. They
were then asked to report how much they believed the message
appealed to their feelings and beliefs, with each question being
presented on a separate page and in a random order.
Results and Discussion
Overall, participants indicated an implicit preference for non-
smoking relative to smoking when measured with the AMP,
M = −0.16, SD = 0.29, t(222) = −7.91, p < 0.0001, d = −0.53.
Participants’ also indicated a self-reported preference for non-
smoking, M = −0.46, SD = 1.80, t(223) = −3.86, p = 0.0001,
d = 0.26. Participants’ self-reported preferences were not reliably
correlated with the AMP, r = 0.10, p= 0.12.
Explicit Evaluations
Smokers’ self-reported evaluations were unaﬀected by the type of
persuasive message they read, F(2,221) = 0.44, p = 0.64. More
speciﬁcally, explicit evaluations were comparable following the
aﬀective message (M = −0.57, SD = 1.74), cognitive message
(M = −0.48, SD = 1.83), and control message (M = −0.30,
SD = 1.86), all ts< 0.94, ps > 0.35, ds < 0.15.
Implicit Evaluations
We tested the eﬀect of the persuasive messages on the AMP
by comparing the AMP diﬀerence scores (i.e., diﬀerence in
proportion of positive responses on smoking and non-smoking
trials) between the three message conditions. AMP scores
were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the type of persuasive message,
F(2,220) = 3.43, p = 0.034. Speciﬁcally, evaluations were
more negative following the aﬀective message (M = −0.21,
SD = 0.33) than the cognitive message (M = −0.09, SD = 0.19),
t(157) = −2.78, p = 0.006, d = 0.45, 95% CIdiﬀ = 0.04, 0.21.
The control message fell within these two means (M = −0.15,
SD = 0.33), but did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from either (both
ts < 1.28, ps> 0.20, ds < 0.22).
Potential Mediators
Because our aim was to determine which aspects of the
cognitive and aﬀective message determined its impact on
implicit evaluations, only the data of the aﬀective and cognitive
message conditions were included in the mediational analyses.
In a conﬁrmation of our pre-testing reported previously
(see Study 1), the aﬀective message was not seen as being
stronger (M = 3.14, SD = 1.25) than the cognitive message
(M = 3.38, SD = 1.10), t(157) = −1.30, p = 0.20, d = −0.21,
thereby eliminating the strength of the persuasive message
as a potential mediator of the observed eﬀects. However,
participants did report that they hear anti-smoking message
like the cognitive one we used more often (M = 3.86,
SD = 1.10) than the aﬀective one (M = 2.88, SD = 1.36),
t(157) = 4.94, p < 0.0001, d = 0.79. Perhaps, therefore, the
eﬀectiveness of the manipulation was due to this diﬀerence
in novelty with participants paying more attention to the
aﬀective message and/or being more practiced at ignoring the
cognitive message. However, the eﬀect of the message type on
AMP scores remained signiﬁcant when controlling for how
often participants reported being exposed to similar messages,
F(1,156) = 6.05, p = 0.015, suggesting that the eﬀect of the
message is not explained via the aﬀective message’s relative
novelty.
Participants also reported that the cognitive anti-smoking
message was more personally relevant (M = 3.22, SD = 1.23)
than the aﬀective one (M = 2.16, SD = 1.19), t(157) = 5.51,
p < 0.0001, d = 0.87. While one might assume that
personally relevant messages would be more impactful on
implicit evaluations, it could be that smokers became more
defensive and, for example, mentally counter-argued in the
face of the more personally relevant cognitive message.
However, after entering this variable into the regression
equation, the eﬀect of the message type remained signiﬁcant,
F(1,156) = 8.21, p = 0.005, suggesting that the eﬀect of
the message is also not explained by the higher personal
relevance of the cognitive message relative to the aﬀective
message.
We hypothesized that our eﬀects would be mediated by
the perceived aﬀective and cognitive nature of the messages.
Reassuringly, participants in the aﬀective condition were much
more likely to agree that the persuasive message “appeals to
feelings and emotions” (M = 4.48, SD = 1.50) than were
participants in the cognitive condition (M = 2.84, SD = 1.55),
t(157) = 6.76, p < 0.0001, d = 1.07. Conversely, participants
in the cognitive condition were much more likely to agree
that the persuasive message “appeals to rational thoughts and
beliefs” (M = 4.29, SD = 1.50) than were participants in the
aﬀective condition (M = 3.44, SD = 1.52), t(158) = 3.55,
p = 0.0005, d = 0.56. When entering ratings of how
cognitive participants found the messages, the eﬀect of the
message type remained signiﬁcant, F(1,156) = 8.10, p = 0.005.
However, when entering ratings of how aﬀective participants
found the persuasive messages, the eﬀect of the message type
became non-signiﬁcant, F(1,155) = 2.30, p = 0.13. The Sobel
test for this mediational analyses was signiﬁcant (z = 1.98,
p = 0.048), supporting our assertion that the messages’ impact
on implicit evaluations occurred via the feelings and emotions
regarding smoking that participants experienced during the
manipulations.
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General Discussion
In four studies, we demonstrated that persuasive messages
inﬂuence even strongly held implicit evaluations in a manner
that crucially depends on the content of the message. This was
observed when the AMP, IAT, personalized IAT, and EP task
were used to capture implicit evaluations. Our research therefore
conﬁrms that implicit evaluations can be changed not only by
extended training methods that involve many trials (e.g., Baccus
et al., 2004; Kawakami et al., 2007), but also by presenting a simple
verbal message. Moreover, it demonstrates for the ﬁrst time that
persuasive messages can also change longstanding, strongly held
evaluations such as evaluations of smoking.
The key result, however, concerned the impact of the
type of message. It is important to remember that the two
messages were rated as being equally strong in argument quality.
Perhaps accordingly, both messages had a similar eﬀect on
explicit evaluations in smokers (i.e., the type of message did
not moderate persuasion of explicit evaluations in smokers).
Interestingly, whereas aﬀective anti-smoking messages had the
desired eﬀect on the implicit evaluations of smoking in smokers,
cognitive anti-smoking messages had an undesired eﬀect in
smokers (i.e., made the implicit evaluations of smoking more
positive). In non-smokers, on the other hand, the nature of the
message had little impact on implicit evaluations of smoking
but tended to moderate changes on explicit evaluations. This
pattern of results has a number of important implications. First,
researchers can optimize the impact of persuasive messages
on implicit evaluations by carefully considering the content of
their message. More speciﬁcally, our data suggest that implicit
evaluations that are aﬀective in nature (e.g., implicit evaluations
of smoking in smokers) are more susceptible to aﬀective
persuasive messages than to cognitive persuasive messages.
Second, researchers who use persuasive messages to target
explicit evaluations should also be aware of the eﬀects of these
messages on implicit evaluations. Although in many cases, both
types of evaluations might be aﬀected in the same way by
persuasive messages, in some cases (e.g., when smokers are
given cognitive anti-smoking messages), implicit evaluations
could be inﬂuenced in ways that run counter to the intended
eﬀects. Some caution is required in drawing this conclusion,
given that this unexpected result was signiﬁcant only in Study
3, even though numerically a similar eﬀect was found in
Study 4.
In the current work, we were interested in examining whether
persuasive messages inﬂuence implicit evaluations in a way that
depends on the content of the message. Our primary focus
was not on the mechanisms by which or reasons for which
these changes occur. Nevertheless, we do have clear hypotheses
about these issues. First, the fact that aﬀective messages had
stronger desired eﬀects on implicit evaluations of smoking in
smokers is most likely driven by the general principle that
persuasive messages are more eﬀective when they match the
to-be-changed evaluations (e.g., Fabrigar and Petty, 1999). As
argued in the introduction, implicit evaluations of smoking in
smokers are most likely aﬀect-based because of their implicit
nature and the fact that evaluations in smokers generally tend
to be aﬀect-based (Traﬁmow and Sheeran, 1998). Although
it is not entirely clear which of these two elements (i.e., the
implicit nature or the smoking-related nature) is crucial in
this respect (see discussion of Study 3), the fact that aﬀective
messages had the biggest desired impact on implicit evaluations
of smoking in smokers is most likely due to the match between
the content of themessage and targeted evaluations. Additionally,
in Study 4, the mediational analysis provided evidence that the
observed eﬀects of the persuasive messages occurred via the
extent to which participants viewed the persuasive messages
as being relevant to their emotions and feelings regarding
smoking.
Second, the contrast eﬀect observed in Study 3 of the cognitive
message on implicit evaluations of smoking in smokers could
be seen as an instance of reactance. This would entail that
smokers had a negative reaction toward the cognitive message
which engendered a positive aﬀective reaction toward smoking.
Such an idea is in line with inoculation theory (McGuire,
1961) which implies that smokers may automatically generate
counterarguments to well-known cognitive arguments. These
counterarguments may be aﬀective in nature or generate positive
feelings toward smoking. Regardless of the merits of this
post hoc explanation, the reactance eﬀect of cognitive anti-
smoking messages observed in Study 3 is an intriguing and
unexpected ﬁnding that deserves further investigation. Also as
noted previously, although this result was in the same direction
using the AMP (in Study 4), it did not reach signiﬁcance. We
feel this eﬀect is one that deserves future studies more speciﬁcally
focused on this issue.
Third, as discussed previously, several mental processes
could be involved in the eﬀect of verbal messages on implicit
evaluations. According to the APE model (Gawronski and
Bodenhausen, 2011), for instance, implicit evaluations can be
changed directly by changing underlying associations or by
changing which associations are activated. One way future
research might distinguish between these two possibilities is by
examining how long eﬀects of persuasive messages on implicit
evaluations last. To date, very little is known about the longevity
of changes in implicit attitudes, including changes induced by
training procedures (but see Ranganath and Nosek, 2008; Wiers
et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012; Mann and Ferguson, 2015).
It may also be informative to test the eﬃcacy of the types
of verbal appeals used in the current work against the longer
training paradigms commonly utilized. These two types of
manipulations could have more in common than seems likely on
the surface. It is possible, for example, that training techniques
commonly used to change implicit evaluations exert their
inﬂuence indirectly through leading participants to construct
explanations for their behavior which then act as persuasive
messages. For instance, implicit attitudes toward smoking might
become more negative in a participant tasked with pushing
away images of cigarettes (see Wiers et al., 2011) because the
participant forms negative conscious beliefs about smoking on
the basis of the training (e.g., “I push away cigarettes because they
are bad”).
Although the current work was not designed to interpret null
eﬀects, issues of power are still relevant. The current samples
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were appropriately sized to test for medium-sized eﬀects (post hoc
power analyses indicate that all comparisons had >80% power,
except for the comparison between aﬀect and cognition in Study
3 for smokers, which had 73% power). That said, the studies
were still not well-powered for ﬁnding small eﬀects (even the
largest samples of Study 2 had less than 40% power to detect
such eﬀects). As such, larger samples will be useful in future work,
especially in understanding potential eﬀects on explicit measures.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current work had a number of limitations, some of which
may inspire future investigations. The most obvious room for
extension of the current work is regarding the attitude object
and the manipulation. We chose to focus the breadth of our
investigation on whether a single manipulation could change
a number of measures of implicit evaluations of smoking. As
such, we focused on fairly direct replications. However, future
work looking at diﬀerent attitude objects (e.g., drinking alcohol)
and using a number of diﬀerent methods of manipulating aﬀect
(and, potentially, cognition) will help to understand whether
the eﬀect generalizes beyond the current materials. This would
also aid in diﬀerentiating between questions we raised previously
as to whether aﬀective messages are best at changing implicit
evaluations only when the attitude object itself is relatively
aﬀective in nature (e.g., smokers’ evaluations of smoking).
Additionally, the observation that smokers’ implicit
evaluations of smoking are negative may seem counterintuitive,
given that they habitually smoke and that previous research
has demonstrated that implicit measures are more related to
impulsive behavior than to relatively reﬂective behavior (e.g.,
Hofmann et al., 2008; Friese and Hofmann, 2009). In other
words, given that smokers smoke, their gut-level responses must
be positive, otherwise why do they smoke? Although this could
cast doubt on the ﬁtness of our implicit measures, we note that
the ﬁndings regarding the direction of our implicit measures is
in line with a number of previous investigations, to which the
reader interested in why implicit smoking evaluations may be
negative is directed (e.g., Swanson et al., 2001; Sherman et al.,
2003; Bassett and Dabbs, 2005; Huijding et al., 2005; Payne et al.,
2007; Rudman et al., 2007; but see De Houwer et al., 2007). It
is important, however, to bear in mind that our research was
concerned with novel ways of changing implicit evaluations
rather than establishing the absolute value or zero-point of
implicit evaluations.
Another limitation is that, although smokers’ implicit
evaluations after reading the control message always fell in
between implicit evaluations after reading the aﬀective and
cognitive messages, the pattern of signiﬁcance was inconsistent.
Future work with a higher-powered design would help to nail
this eﬀect down. Relatedly, aspects of the control condition could
be changed. One option is simply to include a measurement
condition with no reading involved, which would then act more
as a baseline condition. Additionally, we wrote the current
control message to be negative, given that the persuasive
anti-smoking messages were negative in tone. However, this
may have had the eﬀect of priming negativity and led to
more negative implicit smoking evaluations as compared to
baseline evaluations. If that is true, a control condition which
is more positive in tone may be more reliably distinguishable
from the aﬀective condition and may remove the undesired
eﬀect of cognitive messages. Please note, however, that our
results have merit irrespective of the outcome of this future
research. First, persuasive messages will remain an essential
tool in the ﬁght against smoking. In this applied context,
control messages that are unrelated to smoking of course
have little value. Instead, only anti-smoking messages will
be used. Whenever these anti-smoking messages are used, a
decision has to be made about how much emphasis is put on
aﬀective or cognitive arguments. Our work provides important
new information for making that decision: everything else
being equal, aﬀective messages have more desirable eﬀects on
implicit evaluations than cognitive messages. Second, we want
to repeat the fact that our results also have more general
implications. As we noted above, they show for the ﬁrst time that
researchers can optimize the impact of persuasive messages on
implicit evaluations by carefully considering the content of their
message.
Conclusion
In sum, our studies show that persuasive messages can be
used to change long-standing implicit evaluations when the
content of the messages is speciﬁcally geared toward changing
implicit evaluations in a speciﬁc target population. We showed
that persuasive messages can inﬂuence implicit evaluations
in a way depends upon the speciﬁc message content and
properties of the person who is exposed to the message and
that this eﬀect is mediated by feelings and emotions. Our results
contribute not only to our understanding of persuasion and
implicit evaluation, but also have implications for research on
smoking and substance use more generally. Although we did
not study smoking behavior as such, it is widely assumed that
implicit evaluations of smoking have an impact on (smoking)
behavior (e.g., Roefs et al., 2011). Hence, our results open
up new avenues for understanding and changing smoking
behavior. For instance, it suggests that cognitive anti-smoking
messages might actually increase smoking in smokers (see van
‘t Riet and Ruiter, 2011, for a review) because these messages
render smokers’ implicit evaluations of smoking less negative.
Whether persuasion-induced changes in implicit evaluations
of smoking actually inﬂuence behavior, however, needs to be
addressed in future research. In sum, the current work adds
to the overwhelming evidence that implicit evaluations can
be changed, contributes to the very recent assertion that they
can be changed via direct persuasive messages, and is the
ﬁrst to show that the content of such persuasive messages is
integral for understanding the direction of changes in implicit
evaluations.
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